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ABSTRACT 
The processes by which humans and other primates learn to recognize objects have been 
the subject of many models. Processes such as learning, categorization, attention, memory 
search, expectation, and novelty detection work together at different stages to realize object 
recognition. In this article, Gail Carpenter and Stephen Grossberg describe one such model 
class (Adaptive Resonance Theory, ART) and discuss how its structure and function might 
relate to known neurological learning and memory processes, such as how inferotemporal 
cortex can recognize both specialized and abstract information, and how medial temporal 
amnesia may be caused by lesions in the hippocampal formation. The model also suggests 
how hippocampal and inferotemporal processing may be linked during recognition learning. 
1 
A central problem in cognitive neuroscience concerns the processes whereby normal hu-
mans and other primates learn to recognize objects, and how these processes break down 
in different types of amnesic patients. The complexity of these processes has led to the 
development of neural models that might shed light on these issues. The present article 
focusses on how one particular class of neural models, called Adaptive Resonance Theory 
(ART) models, can be applied to this task. ART models have been used to help explain 
and predict a large body of cognitive and neural data about recognition learning, attention, 
and memory search1- 4. ART systems accomplish this synthesis by developing a solution 
to a fundamental problem about learning and memory that is called the stability-plasticity 
dilemma. An adequate self-organizing recognition system must be capa.ble of plasticity in 
order to rapidly learn about significant new events, yet its memory must also remain stable 
in response to irrelevant or often repeated events. For example, how do we learn to recognize 
new faces without risking the unselective forgetting of our parents' faces? In order to pre-
vent the unselective forgetting of its learned codes by the "blooming, buzzing confusion" of 
irrelevant experience, an ART system is sensitive to novelty. It is capable of distinguishing 
between familiar and unfamiliar events, as well as between expected and unexpected events. 
The importance of expectancy and novelty related processes in conditioning and cognitive 
processes has been extensively documented since the pioneering work of Tolman5, Sokolov6,7 
and Vinogradova8. In ART, interactions between an attentional subsystem and an orienting 
subsystem, or novelty detector, self-stabilize learning, without an external teacher, as the 
network familiarizes itself with an environment by categorizing the information within it in 
a way that leads to behavioral success9 . This learning system combines several types of 
processes that have been demonstrated in cognitive and neurobiological experiments, but 
not synthesized into a model system. 
Competitive learning and self-organizing feature maps 
All learning takes place in the attentional subsystem. Its processes include activation 
of short term memory (STM) traces, incorporation through learning of momentary STM 
information into a longer-lasting long term memory (I;I'M) traces, and interactions between 
pathways that carry specific information with nonspecific pathways that modulate the spe-
cific pathways. These interactions between specific STM and LTM processes and nonspecific 
modulatory processes regulate the stability-plasticity balance during normal learning. 
The attentional subsystem undergoes both bottom-up learning and top-clown learning 
between the processing levels denoted by .F1 and .F2 in Figure 1. Level .F1 contains a network 
of nodes, or cell populations, each of which represents a particular combination of sensory 
features. Level.F2 contains a network of nodes that represent recognition codes, or categories, 
which are selectively activated by the activation patterns across .F1. Each .F1 node sends 
output signals to a subset of .F2 nodes. Each .F2 node thus receives inputs from many .F1 
nodes. The thick arrow from .F1 to .F2 in Figure lA represents in a concise way the array of 
diverging and converging pathways shown in Figure lB. Learning takes place at the synapses 
denoted by semicircular endings in the .F1 ~ .F2 pathways. Pathways that end in arrowheads 
do not undergo learning. This bottom-up learning enables .F2 nodes to become selectively 
tuned to particular combinations of activation patterns across .F1 by changing their {;I'M 
traces. 
Why is not bottom-up learning sufficient? This analysis was carried out in a type of 
model that is often called a self-organizing feature map, competitive learning, or learned 
vector quantization. Such a model shows how to combine associative learning and lateral 
inhibition for purposes of learned categorization. 
In such a model, as shown in Figure 2A, an input pattern registers itself as a pattern of 
activity, or STM, across the feature detectors of level .F1. Each .F1 output signal is multiplied 
or gated, by the adaptive weight, or LTM trace, in its respective pathway. All these r;rM-
gated inputs are added up at their target .F2 nodes. Lateral inhibitory, or competitive, 
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Figure 1. Interactions between the atLentional and orienting subsystems of an adaptive 
resonance theory ( AHT) circuit: Level F 1 encodes a distributed representation of an event by 
a short term memory (STM) activation pattern across a network of feature detectors. Level 
F2 encodes the event using a compressed STM representation of the F 1 pattern. Learning 
of these recognition codes takes pbce at the long term memory (LTM) traces within the 
bottom-up and top-down pathways between levels F 1 and F2. The top-down pathways read-
out learned expectations whose prototypes are matched against bottom-up input patterns at 
F 1. The size of mismatches in response to novel events are evaluated relative to the vigilance 
parameter p of the orienting subsystem A. A large enough mismatch resets the recognition 
code that is active in STM at F2 and initiates a memory search for a more appropriate 
recognition code. Output from subsystem A can also trigger an orienting response. (A) 
Block diagram of circuit. (B) Individual pathways of circuit, including the input level Fo 
that generates inputs to level F 1. The gain control input 9! to level F 1 helps to instantiate 
the 2/3 Rule (see text). Gain control 92 to level F2 is needed to instate a category in STM. 
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interactions within F2 contrast-enhance this input pattern. Whereas many F2 nodes may 
receive inputs from F1, lateral inhibition allows a much smaller set of F 2 nodes to store their 
activation in STM. 
Only the F2 nodes that win the competition and store their activity in STM can influence 
the learning process. STM activity opens a learning gate at the LTM traces that abut the 
winning nodes. These I.:I'M traces can then approach, or track, the input signals in their 
pathways, a process called steepest descent. This learning law is thus often called gated 
steepest descent, or instar learning. It was introduced into neural network models in the 
1960's10 and is the learning law that was used to introduce ART11 . Such an LTM trace can 
either increase or decrease to track the signals in its pathway. Thus, it is not a Hebbian asso-
ciative law. It has been used to model neurophysiological data about hippocam~al LTP12•13 
and adaptive tuning of cortical feature detectors during the visual critical period 4•15, lending 
support to ART predictions that both systems would employ such a learning law11 • 
Self-organizing feature map models were introduced and computationally characterized 
in Grossberg11 •16,l'7, von der N.falsburg18, and Willshaw and von der Malsbm;gl9. These 
models were subsequently applied and further developed by many authors20 - 2·'. They ex-
hibit many useful properties, especially if not too many input patterns, or clusters of input 
patterns, perturb level F1 relative to the number of categorizing nodes in level F2. It was 
proved that under these sparse environmental conditions, category learning is stable, with 
LTM traces that track the statistics of the environment, are self-normalizing, and oscillate a 
minimum number of times11 •17 Also, the category selection rule, like a Bayesian classifier, 
tends to minimize error. It was also proved, however, that under arbitrary environmen-
tal conditions, learning becomes unstable. Such a model could forget your parents' faces. 
Although a gradual switching off of plasticity can partially overcome this problem, such 
a mechanism cannot work in a recognition learning system whose plasticity is maintained 
throughout adulthood. 
This memory instability is due to basic properties of associative learning and lateral 
inhibition. An analysis of this instability, together with data about categorization, condi-
tioning, and attention, led to the introduction of ART models that stabilize the memory of 
self-organizing feature maps in response to an arbitrary stream of input patterns11 . 
Memory search, feature binding, and attentional focusing 
In an AHT rnodcl 2•26 , learning docs not occur when some winning J-2 activities are stored 
in S'I'M. Instead activation of F2 nodes may be interpreted as "making a hypothesis" about an 
input at F1. When F2 is activated, it quickly generates an output pattern that is transmitted 
along the top-down adaptive pathways from F2 to F1 . These top-down signals are multiplied 
in their respective pathways by r:rM traces at the semicircular synaptic knobs of Figure 2B. 
The LTM -gated signals from all the active F2 nodes are added to generate the total top-
down feedback pattern from F2 to F1. This pattern plays the role of a learned expectation. 
Activation of this expectation may be interpreted as "testing the hypothesis", or "reading 
out the prototype", of the active F2 category. As shown in Figure 213, AHT networks are 
designed to match the "expected prototype" of the category against the bottom-up input 
pattern, or exemplar, to FJ. Nodes that are activated by this exemplar are suppressed if they 
do not concspond to large LTM traces in the top-down prototype pattern. The resultant 
F 1 pattern encodes the cluster of input featmes that the network deems relevant to the 
hypothesis based upon its past experience. This resultant activity pattern, called X* in 
Figure 213, encodes the pattern of features to which the network "pays attention". 
If the expectation is close enough to the input exemplar, then a state of resonance de-
velops as the attentional focus takes hold. The pattern X* of attended features reactivates 
the F2 category Y which, in turn, reactivates X*. The network locks into a resonant state 
through a positive feedback loop that dynamically links, or binds, X* with Y. Damasio27 
has used the term "convergence ?-Ones" to describe such a resonant process. The reso-
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Figure 2. AHT search for an Fz recognition code: (A) The input pattern I generates the 
specific STM activity pattern X at F 1 as it nonspecifically activates the orienting subsystem 
A. X is represented by the hatched pattern across F 1. Pattern X both inhibits A and 
generates the output pattern S. Pattern S is transformed by the LTM traces into the input 
pattern T, which activates the STM pattern Y across F2. (B) Pattern Y generates the top-
down output pattern U which is transformed into the prototype pattern V. IfV mismatches 
I at F1, then a new STM activity pattern X' is generated a.t F1. X' is represented by the 
hatched pattern. Inactive nodes corresponding to X arc unhatched. The reduction in total 
STM activity which occurs when X is transformed into X* causes a decrease in the total 
inhibition from F 1 to A. (C) If the vigilance criterion fails to be met, A releases a. nonspecific 
arousal wave to F 2, which resets the STM pattern Y a.t F 2. (D) After Y is inhibited, its top-
down prototype signal is eliminated, and X can be reinstated at F1. Enduring traces of the 
prior reset lead X to activate a. different STM pattern Y' at F2. If the top-down prototype 
due to Y' also mismatches I at F 1, then the search for an appropriate F2 code continues 
until a. more appropriate F 2 representation is selected. Then an attentive resonance develops 
and learning of the attended data. is initiated. 
(j 
nar:ce l?inds spatially d~stributed features into ei~he~· a stab)e equilibrium or a synchronous 
osc!llatiOn28 - o, much hke synchronous feature bmdmg m vrsual cortex3l-33, 
In ART, the resonant state, rather than bottom-up activation, drives the learning pro-
cess. The resonant state persists long enough, at a high enough activity level, to activate 
the slower learning process; hence the term adaptive resonance theory. ART systems learn 
prototypes, rather than exemplars, because the attended feature vector X*, rather than the 
input exemplar itself, is learned. These prototypes may, however, also be used to encode 
individual exemplars. How the matching process achieves this is described below, If the 
mismatch between bottom-up and top-down information is too great, then resonance cannot 
develop. Instead the :F2 category is quickly reset and a memory search for a better category 
is initiated. This combination of top-down matching, attention focusing, and memory search 
is what stabilizes ART learning and mernory in an arbitrary input environment. 
The stabilizing properties of top-down matching may be one reason for the ubiqui-
tous occurrence of reciprocal bottom-up and top-down cortico-cortical and cortico-thalamic 
processes34,35, Resonant attention has also been suggested to be necessary for conscious 
experience. The predicted linkage9•11 between learning, attention, consciousness, and syn-
chronous oscillations has recently attracted much interest36 , 
Matching, priming, and phonemic restoration 
The ART attentive matching process is realized by combining bottom-up inputs and 
top-down expectations with a nonspecific a.rousal process that is called attentional gain 
control2,26, An ;:1 node can be fully activated only if two of the three input sources that 
converge on the node send positive signals to the node at a given time. This constraint 
is called the 2/3 Rule. A bottom-up input pattern turns on the attentional gain control 
channel in order to instate itself in STM a.t F 1 (Figure 2A). A top-down expectation turns 
off the attentional gain control channel (Figure 2B ). As a result, only those input features 
that are confirmed by the top-down prototype can be attended at F1 after an F 2 category is 
selected. 
The 2/3 llule, first and foremost, enables an AHT network to solve the stability-plasticity 
dilemma. Carpenter and Grossberg26 proved that AHT learning and memory are stable in 
a.rbitra.ry environments, but become unstable when 2/3 Rule matching is eliminated. Thus a 
type of matching that guarantees stable learning also enables the network to pay attention. 
2j;l Rule matching in the brain is illustrated by experiments on phonemic restora-
tion37-41, Suppose that a noise spectrum replaces a letter sound in a word heard in an 
otherwise unambiguous context. Then subjects hear the correct letter sound, not the noise, 
to the extent that the noise spectrum includes the letter formants. If silence replaces the 
noise, then only silence is heard. 'fop-down expectations thus amplify expected input fea-
tures while suppressing unexpected features, but do not create activations not already in the 
input. 
2/3 Rule matching also explains paradoxical reaction time and error data from priming 
experiments during lexical decision and letter gap detection tasks42·43 , Although priming 
is often thought of as a residual effect of previous bottom-up activation, a combination of 
bottom-up activation and top-down 2/3 Rule matching was needed to explain the complete 
data pattern. This analysis combined bottom-up priming with a type of top-clown priming; 
namely, the top-down activation that prepares a network for an expected event that may or 
may not occur. The 2/3 Rule clarifies why top-clown priming, by itself, is subliminal and 
unconscious, even though it can facilitate supraliminal processing of a subsequent expected 
event. 
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Vigilance, memory search, and generalization 
The criterion of an acceptable 2/3 Rule match is defmed by a parameter p called 
vigilance2•26 . The vigilance parameter is computed in the orienting subsystem A. Vigi-
lance weighs how similar an input exemplar I must be to a top-down prototype V in order 
for resonance to occur. Resonance occurs if plli-IX*I::; 0. This inequality says that the :F1 
attentional focus X* inhibits A more than the input I excites it. If A remains quiet, then an 
:F1 ~ :F2 resonance can develop. 
Vigilance calibrates how much novelty the system can tolerate before activating A and 
searching for a different category. If the top-down expectation and the bottom-up input are 
too different to resonate, then hypothesis testing, or memory search, is triggered. During 
search, the orienting subsystem interacts with the attentional subsystem (Figures 2C and 
2D) to rapidly reset mismatched categories and to select better :F2 representations with 
which to learn about novel events at :F1, without risking unselective forgetting of previous 
knowledge. Search may select a familiar category if its prototype is similar enough to the 
input to satisfy the resonance criterion. The prototype may then be refined by 2/3 Rule 
attentional focussing. If the input is too different from any previously learned prototype, 
then an uncommitted population of :F2 cells is selected a.nd learning of a. new category is 
initiated. 
Because vigilance can vary across learning trials, recognition categories capable of en-
coding widely differing degrees of generalization or abstraction ca.n be learned by a. single 
ART system. Low vigilance leads to broad generalization and abstract prototypes. High 
vigilance leads to narrow generalization and to prototypes that represent fewer input exem-
plars, even a single exemplar. Thus a single ART system may be used, sa.y, to recognize 
abstract categories of faces and dogs, as well as individual faces and dogs. A single system 
can learn both, as the need arises, by increasing vigila.nce just enough to activate A if a. 
previous categorization leads to a predictive error44 - 46. 
ART systems provide a new answer to the question of whether the brain learns prototypes 
or exemplars. Various authors have realized that neither one nor the other alternative is 
satisfactory, a.nd that a hybrid system is needed17 . AHT systems can perform this hybrid 
function in a manner that is sensitive to environmental demands. Table 1 summarizes how 
such a supervised AHT system performs relative to other machine learning, genetic algorithm, 
and back propagation networks in benchmark simulations. 
Memory consolidation and direct access to familiar categories 
As inputs are practiced over learning trials, the search process eventually converges upon 
stable ca.tegorieo. Familiar inputs directly access the category whose prototype provides the 
globally best match, while unfamiliar inputs trigger memory searches for better categories, 
until the memory capacity is fully utilized2. The process whereby search is automatically dis-
engaged is a form of memory conoolidation that emerges from network interactions. Emergent 
consolidation does not preclude structural consolidation a.t individual cells, since persistent 
reoona.nce may be a trigger for learning-dependent cellular processes. 
Face recognition and inferotemporal cortex 
Level :F2 properties may be compared with properties of cell activations in inferotem-
pora.l cortex (IT) during recognition learning in monkeys. The ability of :F2 nodes to learn 
categories with different levels of generalization clarifies how some IT cells can exhibit high 
specificity, such a? selectivi\Y to views of,particular faces, while other cells respond to broader 
features of the amrnal's envJronment48-o . Moreover, when monkeys are exposed to easy a.nd 
difficult discriminations57 , "in the difficult condition the animals adopted a stricter inter-
nal criterion for discriminating matching from nonmatching stimuli ... the animals' internal 
representations of the stimuli were better sepa.ra.ted, independent of the criterion used to 
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ARTMAP BENCHMARK STUDIES 
1. Medical database- mortality following coronary bypass grafting (CABG) surgery 
Fuzzy ARTMAP significantly outperforms: 
Logistic regression 
Additive model 
Bayesian assignment 
Cluster analysis 
Classification and regression trees 
Expert panel-derived sickness scores 
Principal component analysis 
2. Mushroom database 
Decision trees ( 90-95% correct ) 
ARTMAP ( 100% correct; training set an order of magnitude smaller) 
3. Letter recognition database 
Genetic algorithm ( 82% correct) 
Fuzzy ARTMAP ( 96% correct ) 
4. Circle-in-the-Square task 
Back propagation ( 90% correct ) 
Fuzzy ARTMAP ( 99.5% correct) 
5. Two-Spiral task 
Back propagation ( 10,000 - 20,000 training epochs) 
Fuzzy ARTMAP ( 1-5 training epochs ) 
Table 1. Some machine learning benchmark studies15•16 which compare the performance of 
supervised AHT, or ARTMAP, models with that of alternative models. These benchmarks 
describe how well these systems predict test sets when they experience equivalent training 
sets (as in benchmarks 1-4) and the number of epochs, or repetitions of the training set, 
that are needed to reach the same level of accuracy (benchmark 5). 
g 
discriminate them... increased effort appears to cause enhancement of the responses and 
sharpened selectivity for attended stimuli" (pp. 339-310). These are also properties of model 
cells in :F2. Prototypes represent smaller sets of exemplars at higher vigilance levels, so a 
stricter matching criterion is learned. These exemplars match their finer prototypes bet-
ter than do exemplars which match a coarser prototype. This better match more strongly 
activates the corresponding :F2 nodes. 
Data from IT support the hypothesis that unfamiliar or unexpected stimuli nonspecif-
ically activate level F2 via the orienting subsystem. As Desimone58 has noted, "the fact 
that IT cortex has a reduced level of activation for familiar or expected stimuli suggests 
that a high level of cortical activation may itself serve as a trigger for attentional and ori-
enting systems, causing the subject to orient to the stimulus causing the activation. This 
link between the mnemonic and attentional systems would 'close the loop' between the two 
systems, resulting in orienting behavior that is influenced by both current stimuli and prior 
memories. Such a mechanism has a number of similarities to the adaptive resonance theory" 
(p. 359). IT cells during working memory tasks are reset after each triaJ59,60. Reset also 
occurs in ART. Some data suggest that the pulvinar may mediate attentional gain58,61. 
Orienting, hippocampus, and amnesia 
The hypothesis that the ART orienting system has a neural analog in the hippocampal 
formation has considerable experimental support. A lesion of the ART orienting subsystem 
(Figure 3) creates formal symptoms like those of humans with medial temporal amnesia, in-
cluding unlimited anterograde amnesia; limited retrograde amnesia; failure of consolidation; 
tendency to learn the first event in a series; abnormal reactions to novelty, including persever-
ative reactions; normal priming; and normal information processing of familiar events62- 70. 
Unlimited anterograde amnesia occurs because the network cannot carry out the memory 
search to learn a new recognition code. Limited retrograde amnesia occurs because familiar 
events can directly access correct recognition codes2 . Before events become familiar, memory 
consolidation occurs which utilizes the orienting subsystem (Figure 2C). This failure of con-
solidation does not necessarily prevent learning per se. Instead, learning influences the first 
recognition category activated by bottom-up processing, much as "amnesics are particularly 
strongly wedded to the first response they learn" (p. 253)11. Perseverative reactions can 
occur because the orienting subsystem cannot reset sensory representations or top-down ex-
pectations that may be persistently mismatched by bottom-up cues. The inability to search 
memory prevents ART from discovering more appropriate stimulus combinations to attend. 
Normal priming occurs because it is mediated by the attentional subsystem. 
Similar belmvioral problems have been identified in hippocampectomized monkeys. Gaf-
fan 72 noted that fornix transection "irnpairs ability to change an established habit ... in a 
different set of circumstances that is similar to the first and therefore liable to be confused 
with it" (p. 94). In ART, a defective orienting subsystem prevents the memory search 
whereby different representations could be learned for similar events. Pribram 73 called such 
a process a "competence for recombinant context-sensitive processing" (p. 362). These AHT 
mechanisms illustrate how memory consolidation and novelty detection may be mediated by 
the same neural stnrctures70 , why hippocampectomized rats have difficulty orienting to novel 
cues74, and why there is a progressive reduction in novelty-related hippocampal potentials 
as learning proceeds in normal rats75 ·76 In ART, the orienting system is automatically 
disengaged as events become familiar during the memory consolidation process. 
In summary, the hypothesis that the hippocampal formation is linked to orienting sub-
system functions 77 helps to explain amnesic symptoms as manifestations of a breakdown 
in the orienting and memory search mechanisms that normally solve the stability-plasticity 
dilemma. This interpretation does not contradict other data which suggest additional func-
tions for the hippocampal formation 71 •78. A hippocampal role in adaptive timing, condi-
tioned reinforcement, spatial approach and avoidance, and attcntional blocking has been 
10 
Attentional 
subsystem 
STM 
LTM 
+ 
+ 
LTM 
STM F1 
+ 
Input 
Search 
Orienting 
ubsyste 
A 
Figure 3. A memory disturbance with formal symptoms similar to those of medial temporal 
amnesia is caused by a lesion of the model's orienting subsystem. The symptoms are emergent 
properties due to interactions among the nonlesioned network components. The formal 
amnesic syndrome is strikingly similar to the one eaused in humans and monkeys by lesioning 
the hippocampal formation. 
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n:wchanisticall;: outlined within the larger n;ode~ neur3;l systen; that includes A~lT recogni-
tJOn networks -4,77,79. Such a hybnd functJOn rs consrstent wrth data about hrppocampal 
cells with flace fields in a radial-arm maze and conditioned responses in classical condition-
ing tasks8 . These results clarify how the hippocampus may subserve LTP-based learning, 
without suggesting that it temporarily stores recognition codes of many types of sensory 
events until these memories can consolidate in their respective sensory cortices. The disen-
gagement of the orienting subsystem during memory consolidation does not imply that the 
orienting subsystem ever learns a sensory recognition code. 
This larger model system also includes spatial and motor learning circuits22 ,8l,SZ whose 
properties shed new light on the popular distinctions between knowing that and knowing 
how83 , memory with record and memory without record84, taxon and locale74 , memory and 
habit85, and declarative memory and procedural memory86, by clarifying aspects of how 
these distinct processes work and interact. 
Concluding remarks and a cortico-hippocampal prediction 
Many data properties about the inferotemporal cortex and the hippocampal formation 
are rationalized by the ART circuits that solve the stability-plasticity dilemma. These model 
circuits also suggest predictions that may be tested by novel neurobiological experiments. 
For example, varying the vigilance parameter of the orienting subsystem alters the specificity 
of recognition codes that are learned by the attentional subsystem, by calibrating how dif-
ferent an input needs to be from a prototype before the orienting subsystem triggers search. 
This property suggests that operations which make the novelty-related potentials of the 
hippocampus more sensitive to input changes may trigger the formation of more selective in-
ferotemporal recognition categories. Can such a correlation be recorded, say, when monkeys 
learn easy and diflicult discriminations? Conversely, operations that progressively block the 
expression of hippoca.rnpal novelty potentials may lead to the learning of coarser recognition 
categories, with amnet:ic t:ymptoms as a limiting case. 
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